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fect, numerous taxpayers would be subjected to an unanticipated tax.
Without any precedent to follow the court was obviously reluctant to
decide upon an issue with such far-reaching effects. Thus, the court
chose to avoid the Commissioner's argument by determining that the
issue was belatedly raised at trial.
Dielectric serves as the vehicle for the introduction of a new and in-
teresting problem. Perhaps it will act as a catalyst for future presentation
and resolution of this issue. The real problem, however, lies with the
lack of lucidity and consistency between the aforementioned sections
when dealing with the application of the accumulated earnings tax to
unreasonable compensation. It is submitted that this lack of clarity is
a matter which should ultimately be settled by Congress.
Richard M. Serbin
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND EXPENSES-
IMPUTATION OF INTEREST TO CONTROLLED CORPORATE LOANS AND AD-
VANCES-TAXABLE INTEREsT-FREE LoANS--The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that section 482 regulations are constitutionally
valid and therefore, the Commissioner is permitted to impute income
to businesses which make interest-free loans to other members of a
controlled group.
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 496
(1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973).
The petitioner, Kahler Corporation, was engaged in the business of
owning and operating hotel and motel properties. In 1960 petitioner
decided to expand its business by establishing wholly-owned subsid-
iaries. The subsidiaries' capital structure was patterned according to
the norms of the hotel-motel industry which required a 20-30 per cent
capital investment with the remainder obtained through financing. A
substantial number of advances' bearing no interest or definite ma-
turity date were made by petitioner to the subsidiary. The Com-
missioner sought to "allocate" to petitioner a five per cent interest
1. It was determined that the petitioner owed the First National Bank of Minneapolis,
Rochester Band, and North-Western Mutual Life Insurance Company over 6 million dol-
lars, a part of which was used to make advances to the subsidiaries.
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charge based on the average monthly balance of advances made
during the taxable years in question. A proposed correlative adjust-
ment was made to each subsidiary to increase its interest expense to
reflect the interest income imputed to petitioner..
The new regulations2 permit the Commissioner to impute interest
at an arm's length rate when the taxpayer makes loans or advances to
another member of a controlled group. The imputation of interest
income is authorized even if the borrower does not realize income in
the taxable year.
The Tax Court held that under section 482,3 the Commissioner is
authorized to distribute, apportion, and allocate income only where
there is an actual shifting of income, deduction, credits or allowances."
The government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit which reversed the Tax Court and held that the
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2a (1), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 218. This regulation states:
(a) Loans or advances--(l) In general. Where one member of a group of controlled
entities makes a loan or advance directly or indirectly to, or otherwise becomes a
creditor of, another member of such group, and charges no interest, or charges inter-
est at a rate which is not equal to an arm's length rate as defined in subparagraph (2)
of this paragraph, the district director may make appropriate allocations to reflect an
arm's length interest rate for the use of such loan or advance.
(2) Arm's length interest rate. For the purposes of this paragraph, the arm's length
interest rate shall be the rate of interest which was charged, or would have been
charged at the time the indebtedness arose, in independent transactions with or be-
tween unrelated parties under similar circumstances ....
The method of allocation is determined by id. § 1.482-(d)(1), which provides:
(d) Method of allocation. (1) The method of allocating, apportioning, or distributing
income, deduction, credits, and allowances to' be used by the district director in any
case . . . shall be determined with reference to the substance of the particular trans-
actions or arrangements which result in the avoidance of taxes or the failure to clearly
reflect income ....
The district director may impute income according to id. § 1.482-1(d)(4), which provides:
(4) If the members of a group of controlled taxpayers engage in transactions with one
another, the district director may distribute, apportion, or allocate income, deduc-
tions . ., to reflect the true taxable income of the individual members under the
standards set forth in this section and in § 1.482-2 notwithstanding the fact that the
ultimate income anticipated from a series of transactions may not be realized or is
realized during a later period . . . . Similarly, if one member of a group lends money
to a second member of the group in a taxable year, the district director may make an
appropriate allocation to reflect an arm's length charge for interest during such tax-
able year even if the second member does not realize income during such year ....
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1945, § 482, allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers,
provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incor-
porated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary or his
delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines
that distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent eva-
sion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses.
4. Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 58 T.C. 496, 509 (1972), rev'd,
486 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1973).
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newly promulgated regulations are constitutionally valid.5 Therefore,
the Commissioner may use an arm's length rate of interest to impute
income on advances made by the lending corporation.
The issue confronting the Tax Court was whether the Commis-
sioner6 is authorized to impute interest under section 482 between two
or more related corporations without regard to whether the borrowing
corporation had gross income or used the funds to produce income.
The Tax Court concluded that the statute specifically requires
"distribution, apportionment, or allocation" and the borrowing cor-
poration must have realized income from the particular transaction 7
pior to any income allocation. The court explicitly stated that legisla-
tive history indicates allocation should be allowed only where there
has been an actual shifting of the enumerated items in section 482 and
not merely where the controlled corporations have the "power to devise
such artifices."8
The purpose and intent of section 482 is to prevent the shifting of
profits and to clearly reflect the true tax liability9 by distribution, ap-
portionment and allocation. The court stated that the regulations
which permit the Commissioner to impute interest income are in
direct contravention to the statute and without Congressional au-
thority.
The Tax Court has interpreted section 482 consistently since its
enactment (in the 1921 Revenue Act, section 240(d)(8) 10 and re-en-
actments in 1926 as section 240(f)" and as section 4512 in 1928 and
5. 486 F.2d at 4.
6. The Commissioner argued that section 482 and the regulations permit him to "allo-
cate" to petitioner a five per cent interest charge on the advances made to the four sub-
sidiaries. The Commissioner described his imputation of income as an "allocation" but in
fact he was imputing interest. The Tax Court stated ". . . the income which the Commis-
sioner has 'allocated' to the petitioner was created solely through the application of the
regulations promulgated under section 482 and did not exist as a result of the advances
themselves." 58 T.C. at 511.
7. The Tax Court stated that a prerequisite to the Commissioner's allocation authority
under section 482 is the existence of an item of income ". . . which had its genesis in
the particular transaction. ... Id. at 506. The court cited P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 55 T.C.
928 (1971); Huber Homes, Inc., 55 T.C. 598 (1971); Smith Bridgman & Co. 16 T.C. 287
(1951), acquiesced in, 1951-1 CUM. BULL. 3.
8. 58 T.C. at 509.
9. "Section 45 authorizes the Commissioner to make an allocation of gross income
among businesses controlled by the same interests in order (1) to prevent evasion of taxes,
or (2) clearly to reflect the income of any of such businesses." Asiatic Petroleum Co. v.
Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1935).
10. INT. Rxv. ACr. OF 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 260 (now INT. REv. CODE or 1954,
§ 482).
11. INT. REv. Acr OF 1926, ch. 27, § 240(f), 44 Stat. 46 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 482).
Vol. 12: 952, 1974
Recent Decisions
other similar enactments13) by finding that the Commissioner cannot
allocate income where none exists. The lower court in Kahler cited
the House Committee reports on section 45 of the 1928 Act 4 (prede-
cessor to section 482) as "... evidence of its underlying purposes, in pre-
venting.., the evasion (by the shifting of profits, by the making of
fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose
of 'milking'), and in order to clearly reflect their true tax liability."' 5
The cases interpreting section 482 and its predecessors can be di-
vided into the following categories: (a) cases before the promulgation
of the 1968 regulations; (b) cases rejecting the application of these
regulations; and (c) cases applying the regulations.
The first category is exemplified by Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co.
v. Commissioner.'6 Tennessee corporation agreed to rent equipment,
at $1,000 per month during 1933, to a Mississippi corporation owned
and controlled by the same interest as Tennessee. In 1934, the tax
year in question, a leasing agreement was not transacted between the
corporations. The Commissioner 7 allocated rental income to Tennes-
see when the Mississippi corporation sustained an operating loss and
was unable to pay rent. The court concluded that the primary purpose
of section 45 (now section 482) was to clearly reflect income by dis-
tribution, apportionment and allocation, but "not to set up income
where none existed.'1
Subsequently, in Smith Bridgman & Co. v. Commissioner,19 the Tax
Court held the Commissioner may distribute, apportion, or allocate
income2 when income exists and an adjustment 2' is made to the bor-
12. INT. REv. Acr OF 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
482).
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 45, 53 Stat. 25; INT. REv. AcT OF 1938, ch. 289, § 45, 52
Stat. 474; INT. REv. Acr OF 1936, ch. 690 § 45, 49 Stat 1667; INT. REV. Acr OF 1934, ch. 277,§ 45, 48 Stat. 695; INT. REv. Acr OF 1932, ch. 209, § 45, 47 Stat. 186 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 482).
14. The 1926 Act eliminated consolidated returns as required by the 1921 Act, and thus
the government needed power to realize the objectives of section 240(d).
15. H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927), reprinted in 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 395.
16. 112 F.2d. 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
17. Id. at 510. The Commissioner argued that the rental agreement of 1933 served as a
basis for the charge of $12,000 rental income for 1934. Notwithstanding any agreement, the
Commissioner said Tennessee "should have charged" rent.
18. 112 F.2d at 510.
19. 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-1 CuM. BuLL. 3.
20. See Epsen-Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley 67 F: gupp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946) (attempt
by Commissioner to "impute" income to corporation from a partnership); E.C. Laster v.
Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), modified on other issues, 128 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1942)
(transferred leases without any consideration even though oil payments were to be paid
on such leases considered to be creation of income where none existed).21. A correlative adjustment is an adjustment made to the borrowing corporation in-
creasing interest expense to reflect the income that is imputed to the related corporation.
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rowing corporation. Continental department stores owned the capital
stock of Smith and through a board of directors resolution Continental
borrowed an interest-free loan to retire debentures at 102 per cent
of par value plus accrued interest. The Commissioner's argument 22
that interest should be imputed to Smith was rejected despite Con-
tinental's collecting four per cent interest on an outstanding loan to
another corporation.
The cases in the next category were decided after the promulgation
of section 482 regulations in 1968. In Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,23 the corporation, Huber, transferred 52 houses to its wholly-
owned subsidiary at cost. The subsidiary converted the houses into
rental properties and realized gross rental income of $470,000 but
sustained a net loss of $56,000.
The Commisioner allocated income to Huber based upon the differ-
ence between fair market value and cost on the houses transferred to
the subsidiary. 24 Huber argued that no income could be allocated be-
cause no income was realized on the transfer.
The Tax Court held that the Commissioner cannot "create" income
in a transaction which would have produced income had the parties
dealt at arm's length. The court distinguished Treasury Regulations
1.482-1(d)(1) and 1.482-1(d)(4) as applying to the situation where a
member of a controlled group sells to a controlled vendee at cost and
22. The Commissioner argued that "... Continental, in securing these non-interest-
bearing loans from petitioner, was enabled to relieve itself from paying interest on its
outstanding debentures." 16 T.C. at 293. He argued petitioner could have loaned the
funds which Continental borrowed without interest to third parties at four per cent in-
terest. Id.
23. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
24. The Tax Court in Huber Homes relied upon cases such as Oil Base Inc. v. Com-
missioner 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1967), for the principle:
The arm's length standard relied upon by the Commissioner has traditionally been
upheld where it has served as the basis for a reallocation of income derived from
dealings with third parties-i.e., parties other than the controlled corporations which
have engaged in transactions at less than arm's length.
55 T.C. at 606. It should be noted that the court relied on cases that were decided before
the promulgation of the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CUM.
ButI. 218, permits the district director to impute income. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(1) would seem
to be directly applicable under the facts of Huber Homes.
Where one member of a group of controlled entities ... sells or otherwise disposes
of tangible property to another member of such group . . .at other than arm's length
price (such a sale being referred to in this paragraph as a "controlled sale'), the dis-
trict director may make appropriate allocations between the seller and the buyer to
reflect an arm's length price for such sale or disposition. An arm's length price is the
price that an unrelated party would have paid under the same circumstances for the
property involved in the controlled sale. Since unrelated parties noramlly sel products
at a profit, an arm's length price normally involves a profit to the seller.
Id. According to this regulation the district director may charge an arm's length price to
the corporation.
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that vendee sells to a third party. The profit realized in that case must
be allocated to the original vendor in order to prevent the shifting of
profits, even though the sale does not occur until a subsequent year.
This situation was not present in Huber because the houses were to be
used for rental property and there was no intention to resell present.25
In P.P.G. Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,26 the evidence indicated
that a revenue agent "imputed" a portion of the 1960 income at a five
per cent interest rate27 on a 1940 interest-free loan. The Tax Court
concluded there was a "most tenuous connection between this 1940
balance . . . and income some 20 years later."28 The court noted that
it did not decide whether the Commissioner can impute income, which
the court considered indistinguishable from an allocation of income,
but limited itself to whether section 482 applied under the circum-
stances.29
The third category of cases would seem to adopt and to validate the
regulations. The Tax Court in Kahler questioned the validity of the
regulations even though B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner,30 decided
prior to Kahler, permitted interest income to be imputed to the con-
trolled lending corporation.
In Forman, two separate family-owned corporations each made an
interest-free loan of one million dollars3' to a corporation owned by
both. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
those cases 2 which hold that the Commissioner is not authorized to
25. 55 T.C. 598 (1971). The Tax Court in finding the regulation not applicable stated,
"We think that the regulations do not cover the present case where there was no intention
to resell .... " Id. at 610.
26. 55 T.C. 928 (1971).
27. The Tax Court seemed to indicate that the revenue agents charge was arbitrary
when it said:
We do not see how respondent can seriously deny that he is creating an artificial in-
terest charge when the very regulation he relies upon contemplates an adjustment
to income based upon an 'arm's length interest rate.'
Id. at 1009.
28. Id.
29. The Tax Court in P.P.G. Inc., intimated that imputation of income is indistin-
guishable from allocation of income, a break from prior precedent.
30. 54 T.C. 912 (1970), af'd & rev'd in part, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.s. 934 (1972).
31 The loans to Midtown were three year notes bearing no interest and, on the due
dates, the notes were replaced with similar notes in the same amount. 453 F.2d at 1149.
32. The Second Circuit in Forman cited the following cases: Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel
Co. v. Commissioner 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940); P.P.G. Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner 55
T.C. 928 (1971); Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 598 (1971); Atchison, Top. &
San. Fe Ry. v. Commissioner 36 T.C. 584 (1961); Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Smith Bridgman & Co. v. Commissioner 16 T.C. 287 (1951); Combs
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940).
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impute interest on non-interest-bearing loans "are not in accord with
either economic reality, or with the declared purpose of section 482."311
The court stated the regulations must prevail, for without the regu-
lations, section 482 would be seriously impaired.34 Interest income must
be added to the taxpayers' incomes, provided a correlative adjustment
is made to the borrowing corporation. The Commissioner, under the
authority of Treasury Regulation 1.482-2 imputed interest income de-
spite the borrowing corporation's losses for the years in question.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
the Tax Court in Kahler,3 5 basing its decision upon the rationale in
Forman. The court found no weighty reasons for overruling the regula-
tions as being unreasonable or inconsistent with section 482.36 The test
applied by the court was ". . . whether or not the loans from the tax-
payer to other members of a controlled group would have been made
on an interest-free basis in arm's length dealings between uncontrolled
taxpayers." 7
The court concluded that the Commissioner can allocate income
without showing that any part of the gross income was produced by
the borrowed funds.3 8 Furthermore, the court reiterated that the Com-
missioner has the discretionary authority to apply the regulations retro-
actively.89
The Tax Court is in conflict with the Second and Eighth Circuits as
to whether imputation under the current regulations is permitted in
light of section 482 statutory history.
It has been argued section 482 should be applied when some "trace-
able and definable monetary benefit accrues to the affiliates. '40 The in-
termediate "tracing" technique has been adopted in Kerry Investment
Co. v. Commissioner.41 There the parent corporation made interest-free
advances to a subsidiary. These funds were used to make loans to third
parties, to purchase real estate, and to make other investments.
33. 453 F.2d. at 1156.
34. Id.
35. 486 F.2d 1 (1973), rev'd, 58 T.C. 496 (1972).
36. See Commissioner v. South Texas Co. 333 U.S. 496 (1948). The Court reviewed
legislative and administrative history, and judicial decisions citing, Faricus Mach. Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 (1878).
37. 486 F.2d at 5.
38. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Kahler found "no support in legislative history . . . that
transactions . . . be traced to the production of gross income." Id.
39. See Automobile Club v, Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
40. See Note, Recent Extensions of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MEMPH.
ST. L. REv. 106, 116 (1972).
41. 58 T.C. 479 (1972), not acquiesced in, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 3.
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The Commissioner determined that a five per cent interest charge on
the total loans outstanding should be allocated to Kerry. The taxpayer
failed to prove the Commissioner acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable
or capricious manner in allocating this income. 42
The Tax Court held that the Commissioner can allocate income to
the parent if the subsidiary has gross income. This income must be
traced to show that the borrowed funds were used to produce such
income. The burden of proving43 the contrary is on the taxpayer.
The Kahler decision differs from Kerry because the Commissioner in
Kahler limited himself to the imputation of interest income without
"regard to whether the interest-free, borrowed funds produced in-
come." 44 If the Commissioner had argued the tracing technique as
adopted in Kerry, he might have won.
Before the reversal of Kahler, the Tax Court reaffirmed its position
in Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Commissioner.45 The court there held that
if the debtor corporation earns income with the proceeds of a loan from
the creditor corporation, the Commissioner may allocate income.
The burden remained on the taxpayer to prove that gross income was
not attributable to the loans in issue. The assertion of authority to
impute income was argued by the Commissioner to no avail.46
In Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States,47 the corporation was en-
gaged in a small loan business. The parent corporation borrowed from
lending institutions (e.g., banks and insurance companies) at a reduced
interest rate. The parent proceeded to loan this money to its subsidi-
aries at higher rates; the subsidiaries then loaned the money to con-
42. See Marc's Big Boy-Prospect, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), af'd, 452
F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971); Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 598 (1971). The tax-
payer must prove the Commissioner acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious
manner.
43. 58 T.C. at 490.
44. The Tax Court in Kahler concluded:
[Me wish to make it clear that we rest our decision herein on the fact that the
respondent, in his deficiency notice, at trial, and on brief, limited himself to the issue
of straight imputation of interest without regard to whether the interest-free, bor-
rowed funds produced income. Consequently, we do not have before us the issue which
we faced and decided this day in Kerry Investment Co., 58 T.C. 479 (1972). We hold,
therefore, that the imputation of income by the Commissioner with respect to the
Kahler advances was unreasonable and arbitrary and we do not sustain the deter-
mination of the Commissioner.
Id. at 512.
45. 60 T.C. No. 101 (September 29, 1973).
46. The Tax Court in rejecting the Commissioner's argument stated:
To sustain him on that ground would be at odds with our long-standing position on
section 482 which we have so recently reaffirmed, and we decline to do so.
Id.
47. 359 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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sumers. A number of subsidaries were not charged interest for the
taxable year because of an "impaired capital" position.
The district court noted the Commissioner has authority under the
regulations to impute income but this power should not "produce a
wholly ficitious result which does not clearly reflect income." 48 The de-
cision was limited to the facts of the case. When the parent corporation
borrowed from the lending institutions the parent charged the group
as a whole interest based on the amount it had to pay the institution on
behalf of the group. The court in a footnote recognized that other
courts differ on the question of the necessity of proving realized income
from borrowed funds, but found it unnecessary to reach the issue.49
A number of diverse results have been reached since the promulga-
tion of the regulations. In accordance with precedent, Kahler has held
the Commissioner may not impute income but may do so when there is
an actual shifting of income, deductions, credits or allowance. In Kerry,
the court ruled that the Commissioner may allocate income where the
income may be traced to the proceeds. The Second Circuit in Forman
held that the Commissioner may impute income to the creditor cor-
poration even if income does not exist.
The apparent utility of the "tracing" approach sanctioned by Kerry
is misleading.50 If, for example, the borrower used the money for real
estate purchases, would rental income be attributable as "rental" or
"interest" income?51 Furthermore, if the borrower should not decide to
utilize the funds until a later period, continuous policing would be
required. In a complex transaction 52 the court would be left with great
administrative problems. The Tax Court, however, applied the ra-
tionale of Kerry despite Judge Featherston's admonishment in Kerry
that the tracing concept "places a premium on accounting sophistica-
tion and lays a 'trap for the unwary.'53
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 165.
50. The dissenting Judge Featherston in Kerry stated:
As I read section 482 and these regulations, the applicability of that section does not
depend upon the realization of pretax profits from a particular non-arm's-length
transaction or, in the case of borrowed funds, the use to which they are placed. The
section refers to 'gross income' and 'deductions' and does not specify the source from
which they may be derived. . .. [Tihe concept gives birth to a mischievous rule
.... pIt places a premium on accounting sophistication and lays a 'trap for the
unwary.'
58 T.C. at 495.
51. See Hamlin, Section 482 in the 1970's: Commissioner's Authority to Allocate, When,
How, and to Whom, 25 S. CAL. 1973 TAx Iiar. 701.
52. Id. at 715.
53. 58 T.C. at 495.
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In holding that the Commissioner may impute interest on loans be-
tween related entities, the Second Circuit in Forman necessarily con-
cluded that the new regulations are in accord with the scope and pur-
pose of section 482.54 The Forman rationale 5 has been criticized, sihce
Congress re-enacted section 45 after the Tax Court in Tennessee de-
clared succinctly that income cannot be "created" where none exists.56
As a corollary, Congress had impliedly accepted the Tax Court's in-
terpretation of section 45, therefore, the Second Circuit's decision in
Forman should be overruled. Further, the regulations had the same
scope and purpose before the promulgation of the 1968 regulations, 57
and the Tennessee decision would have necessarily reflected the in-
tended scope of section 45(482).
The regulations have been rejected not only by the Tax Court, but
also by academicians and scholars. One author has stated that the regu-
lations are unsupported by judicial authority and that the ". . . appli-
cation of the arm's length doctrine, without consideration of the end
result of a transaction or series of transactions between affiliates, does
not necessarily reach the right result.' 58 A literal interpretation of sec-
tion 482 supports the conclusion that gross income must exist before
allocation.59 The Kahler court stated, "If an interest charge is to be
placed indiscriminately on loans between related entities without con-
sideration of whether loans produced realized income, we feel that it is
the Congress, and not this court, which should so provide."' 0
54. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(a), (b) (1954).
55. The Second Circuit in Forman stated that section 482 has been interpreted liberally
and cited Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1152, afl'd, 79 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935), for the principle that 'gross income' in section 45
(predecessor to section 482) is to be construed broadly. 453 F.2d at 1152.
56. See Comment, Section 482-Allocation-Interest Free Advances to Controlled Sub-
sidiaries Held to Create Income Allocable to Controlling Taxpyers-B. Forman Co. Inc.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 169 (1973).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1 (1954), sets forth the scope and purpose of section 482. This
regulation existed before the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and was
utilized to interpret section 482 and its predecessors. The 1968 regulations have given an
expansive interpretation to section 482 broader than the interpretation given by prior
precedent.
58. Jenks, The Creation of Income Doctrine; A Comment on the Proposed Section 482
Regulations, 43 TAXEs 486 (1965).
The consolidation of accounts, that is, a consolidation of the particular transaion or
series of transactions between related enterprises, may be preferable to the approach
in the proposed regulation. It would appear to avoid the two principal defects of the
proposed regulation, which are: (a) the taxation of income prior to its realization by
dealings outside the controlled group, and (b) the taxation of fictitious income ....
Id. at 493. See Hamlin, Correct Allocations Under Section 482 Are Still Difficult Despite
New Regulations, 33 J. TAXATION 358 (1970).
59. See note 48 supra.
60. 58 T.C. at 511.
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In view of Treasury Regulation 1.482-1(d)(4) and the Forman case,
the Tax Court's rationale in Kahler should be rejected. The holding
that the Commissioner can only allocate income where it actually exists
is unequivocally arbitrary. The Commissioner should be able to impute
income between members of a controlled group on interest-free loans.
The purpose underlying section 482 is to prevent the shifting of profits
and the evasion of taxes; and to allow a clear reflection of the income
of such corporations.
If, for example, the A corporation loans funds to B corporation and
the borrowing corporation invests in non-taxable bonds, the lending
corporation would incur no taxable income according to Kerry. Further,
assuming the Commissioner made a correlative adjustment to the bor-
rowing corporation as in Smith, the Tax Court would rule that income
was not produced in retiring the bonds. In the second hypothetical the
use of non-interest-bearing proceeds allowed the borrowing corporation
to retire bonds profitably without incurring any expense. Under both
hypotheticals the Tax Court would not have permitted the Commis-
sioner to allocate income because no income was produced by use of
the borrowed funds.
The proceeds in both hypotheticals actually injected capital that
either produced income or released other capital for productive use.
The Tax Court's interpretation in Kahler permits corporations to shift
income without any recognition and thus indirectly to shift profits in
contravention of section 482.
The immediate recognition of income by imputation precludes the
indirect shifting of profits and avoids the continuous policing and ad-
ministrative problems inherent in Kerry. To allow the Commissioner
to impute interest will prevent an astute lawyer or accountant from
furthering this diversion of profits.
Patsy A. lezzi, Jr.
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